Mr. Sander, as between the vendor and vendee that land contract can be legally enforced.  Even though no performance be made.
Also, Code section 624.23(1) does not limit statutory liens of judgment to only those lands the defendant owns **of record**.
Bottom Line Up Front:  Vendor must forfeit the agreement, to flush the vendee's judgment liens.

624.23  Liens of judgments -- real estate -- homesteads -- support judgments.
1. Judgments in the appellate or district courts of this state, or in the circuit or district court of the United States within the state, ****are liens upon the real estate owned by the defendant at the time of such rendition, and also upon all the defendant may subsequently acquire****, for the period of ten years from the date of the judgment.

Hunter v. Citizens Savings & Trust Co., 157 Iowa 168, 138 N.W. 475, Am.Ann.Cas. 1915C, 1019 (1912):
"A judgment lien is a creature of the statute, and, except as there provided, none exists. Our statute (Code, § 3801) provides that judgments in courts of record are liens upon real estate owned by the defendant at the time of such rendition, and also upon all he may subsequently acquire for the period of 10 years from that date. This has been held applicable to both legal and equitable interests in lands. Brebner v. Johnson, 84 Iowa, 23, 50 N. W. 35."

Vigars v. Hewins, 184 Iowa 683, 169 N.W. 119 (1918):
"It is, of course, true that a judgment will attach to, and become a lien upon, an equitable interest in real estate held at the time, or acquired subsequent to, the judgment. Clayton v. Ellis, 50 Iowa, 590; Boyle v. Maroney, 73 Iowa, 70, 35 N. W. 145, 5 Am. St. Rep. 657." 

In re Bernhard's Estate, 134 Iowa 603, 112 N.W. 86, 12 L.R.A.N.S. 1029 (1907):
"The legal question presented by this record is whether the money in the hands of the court or the executor is personal property which is to be distributed under the residuary clause of the will, or whether it should be treated as real estate devised by the eighth clause of the will. The appellants claim that the bond for a deed was an executory contract, and did not pass any title, either legal or equitable; while the appellees contend that there was an equitable conversion of the real estate into personal property, and that such personal property passed upon the death of Bernhard to his executors as personalty. We do not find it necessary to determine in this particular case whether the bond in question passed even an equitable title to the vendees named therein, although we are inclined to the opinion that, taken as a whole, it may fairly be said to have passed such equitable title. It is well established in both England and this country that land which is sold or contracted to be sold and turned into money is to be considered as that species of property into which it is directed to be converted, “and this in whatever manner the direction is given, whether by will or by way of contract, marriage articles, settlement, or otherwise; and whether the money is actually deposited or only contracted to be paid, whether the land is actually conveyed or only to be conveyed, the owner of the fund or the contracting parties may make land money or money land.” See 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 619; Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 563, 4 L. Ed. 460; Greenland v. Waddell, 116 N. Y. 234, 22 N. E. 367, 15 Am. St. Rep. 400; Bispham's Principles of Equity, § 307. Where such conversion is by contract, it is only necessary as a general rule that the contract be enforceable. The question in such cases is whether the vendor or purchaser, as the case may be, at the time of his death, was either absolutely or contingently under such an agreement as equity would enforce against him. Dart on Vendors, 338 (4th Ed.); Keep v. Miller, 42 N. J. Eq. 100, 6 Atl. 495; Williams v. Haddock, 145 N. Y. 144, 39 N. E. 825. ... And it is also true that, when the title passes under the terms of the contract, it relates back to the date of the contract, and the vendor is treated as holding the legal title as trustee for the purchaser. This result is said to rest upon the principle that equity regards that as done which is agreed to be done. Story's Eq. Jur. §§ 789, 790, 1212 (12th Ed.); 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. (2d Ed.) § 368, and cases cited. The contract under consideration is conclusive evidence of the fact that Bernhard intended to dispose of this land and to receive the purchase money, if the vendees named therein determined to take the land and pay the purchase price. It is evident, therefore, that he could not have intended that his will should operate upon the land, and that it should go to the appellants in virtue of the eighth clause thereof."


Ergo:
1) equitable conversion of vendor's interest into personalty (vendor's lien) has occurred, and vendee acquired title to real estate.
2) liens of judgments against vendee necessarily have attached to vendee's interest.


No Iowa case that I can find explicitly states that a judgment against a vendee under an unrecorded contract attaches to that real estate.
Hornbook law provides that statement.  Patton & Palomar give you the answer you seek:

3 Patton & Palomar on Land Titles 3d, section 571, pp.135-37 (2003):
"A judgment that has become a lien also covers unrecorded interests in land owned by the debtor,13 including land that is subject to an outstanding purchase contract.  A judgment lien that has attached to a purchaser's interest is not divested by a resale to the vendor or by a voluntary cancellation of the sales contract by the vendee.16  But if the vendor terminates the vendee's interest because of default of the vendee, the lien ceases with it.17"

FN13,17 citing Hunter v. Citizens Savings, supra
N16 citing Thomassen v. DeGoey, 133 Iowa 278, 110 N.W. 581 (1907):
"The judgment became a lien upon the Van Wyk interest in the land from the date of the levy of the execution, if not before, and no conveyance or voluntary surrender by Van Wyk thereafter made or attempted could have the effect to take that interest from under the levy or defeat the sale which had been made. True, if the contract was one in which a right of forfeiture had been reserved to the seller and good cause of forfeiture had arisen, he could have enforced it against the purchaser at sheriff's sale in the same manner and to the same extent that he could have enforced it against Van Wyk." 


Patton's conclusion provides a logical corollary to existing rulings: that judgment against a post-contract vend**or** does NOT attach to the vendee's real estate interest.

Cumming v. First National Bank, 199 Iowa 667, 202 N.W. 556 (1925):
"On this [judgment[ date the agreement was not a mere option but constituted a valid contract and subject to specific performance. Here a landowner enters into a contract of sale whereby the purchaser agrees to buy and the owner agrees to sell. The vendor retains the legal title until the purchase money is paid. No other condition is attached. Under such circumstances, the ownership of the real estate as such passes to the purchaser, and from that time forth the vendor holds legal title as security for his debt and as trustee for the purchaser. In re Miller, 142 Iowa, 563, 119 N. W. 977. This is the recognized rule in Iowa. The title in equity passed to the vendee. It is not dependent upon a conveyance nor the payment of the purchase money, nor is possession or delivery of possession a necessary incident." 


So for sake of safety for vendor's title, forfeit the unrecorded agreement.

David Hanson
Hofmeyer & Hanson PC
Fayette, Iowa



----- Original Message -----
From: "Kevin" <realestate@iabar.org>
To: realestate@iabar.org
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2017 10:45:38 AM
Subject: [ISBA RealEstate]  attachment on unrecorded real estate contract

Listmates,

I have a real estate contract recently signed, in which Buyer wants to voluntarily terminate. Seller is agreeable. Contract was for "cash sale" and not installments. However it has been my understanding that any judgments against Buyer would attach upon signing of contract, and therefore prudence would require lien search and if judgment exist, then forfeiture is required.

Am I correct in such opinion regardless of whether contract was ever recorded and therefore any judgment holder would never be apprised of any such attachment? Seller wants to simply receive a signed Consent from Buyer and avoid expense and delay of going through forfeiture.

Kevin R. Sander

Fitzgibbons Law Firm
P.O. Box 496
Estherville, Iowa 51334
Telephone:  (712)  362-7215
Facsimile:  (712) 362-3526
ksander@fitzgibbonslawfirm.com<mailto:ksander@fitzgibbonslawfirm.com>
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